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We study the impact of the euro on emerging European coun-
tries by investigating three country groups: (1) seventeen Euro-
zone countries, (2) seven eu Eastern and Central European (ece)
members using local currencies, and (3) six eu Candidates. We
analyze macroeconomic indicators and propose models to inves-
tigate whether similar or different indicators inﬂuence sovereign
debt for each group. We ﬁnd that exports and unemployment are
positively related to sovereign debt while market capitalization
shows negative relation with sovereign debt. We argue that the re-
cent European sovereign debt crisis has raised serious challenges
for the Eurozone, and propose that eu ece members and eu can-
didates delay the adoption of the euro.
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Introduction
The creation of the European economic and monetary union had
been a long and carefully planned process intended to embrace the
historically fragmented European countries and, among other bene-
ﬁts, increase their international productivity and trade competitive-
ness. Not a small task in itself, the creation of the euro has brought
some positive and some challenging developments for the European
Union (eu).
The eu has been instrumental in promoting peace, prosperity,
productivity, economic integration, free movement of factors of pro-
duction and economies of scale amongst its member states (Chang
2010). However, the recent ﬁnancial crisis and the possible impact it
might have on the stronger members of the union and on the world
economy has raised concerns of whether the unique social, economic
and political partnership earlier envisaged is indeed sustainable.
In this work we study the relationships between macroeconomic
indicators for three different groups of countries: (1) seventeen Eu-
rozone countries, (2) seven eu ece members that still use their lo-
cal currencies, and (3) six eu candidate countries. We investigate
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table 1 Illustration of signiﬁcant changes in selected macroeconomic indicators
for eu ece members currently in the pipeline for adoption of the euro,
and eu candidate countries
Indicators Groups Countries 1999–2000 2010–2011
Sovereign Debt
(% of gdp)
eu ece countries Bulgaria 74 15
Hungary 60 80
eu candidates Macedonia 47 28
Iceland 43 99
Inﬂation eu ece countries Poland 7.3 2.7
Romania 45 6
eu candidates Serbia 42 6
Croatia 4 1
Turkey 65 8.5
Market
Capitalization
eu ece members Romania 2 20
Bulgaria 5 15
eu candidates Croatia 11 41
Macedonia 0.2 29
gdp per
capita growth
eu ece members Lithuania –0.4 3
Romania –1 1.1
eu candidates Montenegro –9 2.2
Serbia –11 1.4
Turkey –4.8 1.4
fourteen macroeconomic indicators: research and development, gov-
ernment debt, imports, exports, inﬂation, foreign direct investment,
market capitalization of exchange-listed companies, gross domestic
product per capita growth, unemployment, tertiary education, and
representation of women in national parliaments, use of electricity,
energy consumption, and CO2 emissions. We develop three multiple
regression models, to understand which macroeconomic indicators
lead to sovereign debt for each group of countries that we study.
We test the following hypotheses: (1) that market capitalization
of exchange-listed companies leads to sovereign debt, (2) electricity
use leads to sovereign debt, (3) exports lead to sovereign debt, and
(4) unemployment leads to sovereign debt.
Our results show that there are convergences among the three
groups of countries analyzed here in sense that similar macroeco-
nomic indicators are signiﬁcant for explaining the sovereign debt for
different country groups. This shows that the European Union has
achieved an important cohesion level, which also can be used as an
argument that imminent joining of the monetary union may not be
necessary for the eu ece members that still use their local currency
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and for the eu candidate countries. We argue that delaying of the
euro adoption may be beneﬁcial for all three groups of countries an-
alyzed in this study. Upholding the local currencies could give mon-
etary ﬂexibility to the eu ece and eu candidate countries and posi-
tion them better to curb the current global ﬁnancial and sovereign
debt crisis, and it may give the Eurozone breathing space to focus
on the current euro problems instead of adding new countries into
the monetary union and increasing the probability of new emerging
problems.
The questions that we are tackling in this study are whether and
when should eu ece countries that still use their local currencies
and the eu candidate countries adopt the euro.
In the next section we provide background literature review ad-
dressing the advantages and disadvantages of common currency,
and the challenges for the eu ece and eu candidate countries. In the
third section we describe the data and methodology including re-
gression analysis and hypothesis testing results for the three differ-
ent groups of European countries investigated in this study, in the
fourth section we discuss policy implications, and in the ﬁfth section
we offer brief concluding remarks.
Literature Review
common currency: a panacea or a pandora’s box
Research studies have shown many beneﬁts of monetary integration
and use of common currency. Among the beneﬁts, increased trade,
measured as combined imports and exports among the countries
that use common currency has been prominently studied (Frankel
and Rose 2002; Micco, Stein, and Ordonez 2003; Bun and Klaasen
2007). Inter-country trade of goods and services signiﬁcantly en-
hances overall economic performance of a country and it is an im-
portant determinant of growth in gdp as well as real income growth.
Another beneﬁt of joining a monetary union is the prospect of price
stabilization, which is quite desirable after turbulent periods of
structural price changes that countries experience during the tran-
sitional pre-eu accession period. Also, joining a common currency
is beneﬁcial if eu candidate countries have experienced high inﬂa-
tionary periods and seek stability for their currencies (Frankel 2004;
Wdowinski 2005). However, while the common currency can provide
a safety harbor, it is also the one to be blamed for precipitating ﬁ-
nancial crisis. For example, within a monetary union, when investors
expect any member country to not meet its sovereign debt obliga-
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tions, they will be motivated to sell-off that country’s government
bonds and invest the proceeds in securities of other countries using
the same currency. As a result, the country in trouble will further be
pushed into economic downfall since it will experience difﬁculties
in rolling over its debt obligations. On the other hand, if the country
uses its own currency, not all lenders would pull out their invest-
ments at the ﬁrst sign of trouble, since the country’s Central Bank
could offer interim solutions by repurchasing the government bonds
or restructuring the sovereign debt. In addition, if the investors sell
the bonds, they will either have to sell the country’s currency in the
foreign exchange market or invest in other parts of the same coun-
try’s economy. As such, the crisis could be contained to a certain
extent. In a monetary union, however, member nations relinquish
control over the currency of their borrowing and hence are more
vulnerable to economic distress (De Grauwe 2011; Kopf 2011).
financial and economic integration
Deeper ﬁnancial integration was one of the main reasons why Eu-
ropean countries have joined and continue to join the Eurozone.
However, ﬁnancial integration is considered as one of the main cul-
prits behind the Eurozone Sovereign debt crisis. Adoption of the
euro led to opening up of the ﬁnancial and banking sectors in the
eu countries. Hence, the developed nations of the region, that were
ﬂush with funds, could invest in the emerging and developing Eu-
rozone members. Interest rates and inﬂation were low throughout
the euro region. Capital and factors of production could potentially
move freely. More developed countries like Germany invested sig-
niﬁcantly in Greece, Spain and other developing members of the eu.
However, with Greece at the brink of default, German balance sheet
was severely impacted by being populated with almost worthless in-
vestments. This spillover effect could have fatal consequences for
the entire Eurozone. (Arezki, Candelon, and Sy 2011). As an exten-
sion of the Sovereign debt crisis spillover effect, it would not be sur-
prising if in the future, when investors forecast economic difﬁculties
in one Eurozone country, they ﬂee not only the troubled country, but
also other countries that have stakes in this country’s Sovereign debt
or are involved in signiﬁcant business relations with the troubled
country. This will have an effect of catalyzing and exacerbating the
crisis.
One of the reasons for the members of the Eurozone to adopt a
common currency was to strive to increase productivity and to not
use the currency as a competitive tool. While this is a very noble
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cause to adopt the euro, it is fraught with its own problems (Chang
2010). For a developing economy that experiences slowdown, giving
up control of its currency means that it cannot use currency deval-
uation to stay competitive in the world market. Rather, the country
will need to adopt deﬂationary measures or renegotiate labor con-
tracts, which can be very difﬁcult socially and politically. This can
lead a nation to a downward economic spiral, making the recovery
from the trough even more painful (Krugman 2012).
Furthermore, while deeper integration of the factors of production
provides for free factor migration to any region where production
factors can be most useful (Chang 2010), in crisis situations such as
the most recent 2008 global economic downturn, the free movement
of production factors also contributes to a greater outﬂow of labor to
countries that potentially have more opportunities for employment.
This can temporarily ease the problem of unemployment in the trou-
bled nations but in the long run, it will result in lower tax revenue
for the troubled governments. In addition, the working age popula-
tion that remains in the distressed developing countries will proba-
bly not be very productive, further reducing the competitiveness of
these nations and making austerity measures even more difﬁcult to
implement.
Thus, despite the beneﬁts of using common currency such as elim-
inating foreign exchange risks and promoting signiﬁcant economic
growth and development, there are important advantages for some
countries to maintain local currencies and to retain the monetary
policy ﬂexibility when needed. For example, in times of signiﬁcant
downturns, if a country uses its local currency, the government can
reduce the real interest rate to encourage investments in domestic
businesses or to depreciate its currency to boost the exports towards
the countries with stronger currencies. This is only beneﬁcial if the
domestic economy is not correlated with the economies of the coun-
tries in the prospective common currency area. Otherwise, similar
monetary policies will be pursued for the speciﬁc country and the
monetary union (Frankel 2004). On the other hand, while a common
currency area is expected to bring further relative price and wage
convergence, there would still be incidences of asymmetric economic
shocks throughout the union due to country-speciﬁc events. A com-
mon currency would implore on the stronger economies to bear the
burden of the shocks in their weaker counterparts. For the weaker
members, common currency also comes at a high cost of not being
able to adjust relative prices and wages by depreciating their lo-
cal currency. Thus, due to asymmetric shocks requiring compensat-
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ing transfers within the common currency area, and reducing mem-
ber ﬂexibility to adjust their local economies, monetary unions, be-
sides the advantages, have potentially high costs as well (Barro 2012;
Krugman 2012). Furthermore, a relatively strong economy might
have to deal with the moral hazard issues arising from less ﬁscally
responsible countries, and be asked to pay for the negligent ﬁnancial
behaviors of other countries in the monetary union.
challenges for eu ece members using local currencies
and eu candidate countries
The member states that have joined the eu since 2004 are on the
path of adopting the euro as part of their accession plan. The timing
of adopting the euro will depend primarily on satisfying the Copen-
hagen criteria, the Maastricht core economic requirements, and
whether the economic convergence process could be more success-
ful while outside or inside the Eurozone (Allam 2009; Lee 2012). The
eu ece member countries have emerged as market economies from
former Eastern European communist regimes, and are progress-
ing towards the euro in a very different environment, taking into
consideration the globalization pace and the faster ﬁnancial market
integration in the last 10–15 years (Darvas and Szapary 2008b). The
challenges to joining the eu for the former communist countries are
at least two-fold. Besides the required changes in the economic en-
vironments and the conversions of property rights from centralized
to private, the accession to the eu also represents an important cul-
tural, societal and political transformation for most eu ece member
countries.
Until recently, before experiencing the severity of the sovereign
debt crisis propagation in the Eurozone, the euro was very desir-
able and the public expectations were that almost all of Europe will
adopt the common currency. This sentiment has since changed, and
none of the seven eu ece countries that are required to adopt the
euro is enthused by the prospect of relinquishing their local curren-
cies. Instead, the eu ece countries are seriously reexamining their
requirement to adopt the euro. United Kingdom and Denmark, on
the other hand, have an explicit option not to adopt the euro which
they can readily exercise. In addition, even though Sweden does not
have a speciﬁc provision for not adopting the euro, the country has
purposefully been delaying satisfaction of one of the requirements
necessary to join the monetary union (Barro 2012).
Darvas and Szapary (2008a) have shown that after the privatiza-
tion and development of the banking sectors in the eu ece countries,
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the lending capacity of the banks as well as the competition among
the banks has greatly increased. Along with these trends, and the
decreased interest rate margins, the banks have offered more and
larger loans to not only the commercial but also the retail sector in
order to stay proﬁtable. Mortgages and other household loans have
been the fastest growing products in the lending market, with the
highest growth rates achieved in Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, and
Romania. It is worth noting that most of the credit expansion was
denominated in euro since the interest rates were lower in the Eu-
rozone (Allam 2009). Also, Germany and other Eurozone countries
with stronger balance sheets were the ones infusing most of the cap-
ital in the developing Europe.
Financial liberalization studies have examined the credit exten-
sion and growth for European emerging countries and the results
have demonstrated that in general credit levels are below equilib-
rium indicating further expansion capabilities. However, the credit
growth rate, rather than the credit level, is the important trend to
follow in order to maintain low inﬂation and high macroeconomic
stability (Egert, Halpern, and MacDonald 2006; Sirtaine and Skam-
nelos 2007).
Generally, high inﬂation negatively affects the currencies, so keep-
ing it in check is extremely important for currency stability and a
country’s economic prosperity. A weak domestic currency worsens
the problems of the country when much of its credit expansion is
funded in euro. Inﬂation can be exacerbated by high non-fdi (For-
eign Direct Investment) capital inﬂows in the European emerging
countries, originally attracted by signiﬁcant growth prospects, higher
nominal interest rates, and expectations of yield convergence in an-
ticipation of euro adoption. In addition, the non-fdi capital inﬂows
can place upward pressure on the currencies of countries with ﬂoat-
ing rate regimes, could erode the competitiveness of these countries,
and force the policymakers to lower interest rates to levels that cre-
ate price instabilities (Darvas and Szapary 2008b). This trend could
potentially create an aftershock bubble in the real estate market and
in the emerging European ﬁnancial markets, which could increase
the severity of the current economic situation in the euro area. Fi-
nancial market integration usually means integration of ﬁnancial
markets, inter-relations of different countries’ banking systems, and
uniformity of rules for investment market access for different market
participants (Baele 2004).
Table 2 shows that between 1989 and 2006, the European Union
has allocated signiﬁcant funds to support its members’ development
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table 2 Distribution of structural and cohesion funds, 1989–2006
Group Country (1) (2)
Cohesion countries Spain 111,564.0 (6,198.5) 1.10
Portugal 46,283.4 (2,571.3) 2.50
Ireland 16,000.8 (895.1) 1.60
Greece 50,922.0 (2,829.3) 3.10
Other eu countries Austria 3,096.0 (258.1) 0.11
Belgium 4,753.8 (264.1) 0.10
Denmark 1,818.0 (101.0) 0.06
Finland 3,459.6 (288.3) 0.26
France 36,275.0 (2,015.3) 0.13
Germany 58,181.0 (3,232.3) 0.14
Italy 61,905.6 (3,439.2) 0.30
Luxembourg 255.0 (14.2) 0.08
Netherlands 6,035.4 (335.3) 0.09
Sweden 3,153.6 (262.8) 0.12
United Kingdom 33,827.4 (1,879.3) 0.16
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) total funds – annual average, millions
of ecus( E u r o p e a nc u r r e n c yu n i t ) ,( 2 )f u n d sa sap e r c e n to fgdp (for 1996). Adapted
from Pastor (2001).
efforts of poor regions in form of structural and cohesion funds.
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Germany are among the largest re-
cipients of structural and cohesion funds, closely followed by France
and the United Kingdom.
financial stability in europe
More recently, in light of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and 2010 sovereign
debt crisis, the European Union established support and stabi-
lization mechanisms such as the European Financial Stabilization
Mechanism (efsm) and the European Financial Stability Facility
(efsf) to contribute towards ﬁnancial stability in the midst of the
European sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, in October 2012, the Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism (esm) was created to focus on Eurozone
sovereign debt sustainability and prevention of a future crisis emer-
gence. These mechanisms offered ﬁnancial assistance funds to help
European troubled countries such as Greece, Portugal, and Ireland.
While these are smaller economies, the real upcoming threat for
Europe could be the signiﬁcant indebtedness of Italy and Spain as
signiﬁcantly larger economies compared to Greece, Portugal and
Ireland. Spain has already asked for 100 billion Euros through efsf,
and will receive the funds contingent upon speciﬁc policy implemen-
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tations in the realm of its ﬁnancial sector (European Commission
2013; imf 2012). Possibly, Italy will be the next country to require
assistance from these newly formed Eurozone mechanisms. Fur-
thermore, we argue that the European sovereign problems are not
contained to the gipsi (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy)
countries, but rather could extend to countries such as Germany
and France as well, given that the trend of sovereign debt levels
as percentage of gdp (Gross Domestic Product) for these countries
continues to increase as shown in table 3.
If the observed upward trend of sovereign debt as percentage
of gdp continues, especially for the larger economies such as Italy,
Spain, Germany and France, this could prolong the current sovereign
debt crisis and prove more troublesome for Europe. This possibility
is explored in scenario analysis and forecasting of the Spanish and
Italian debt for the period of 2012 to 2020 (Cline 2012) showing that
under certain scenarios, the debt levels may continue to increase.
The other groups that we study, eu ece countries that use their lo-
cal currencies and eu candidates, have signiﬁcantly lower sovereign
debt levels compared to the Eurozone average, with exception of
Iceland (eu candidate) with sovereign debt at 99 percent of gdp and
Hungary (ece country that uses local currency) with 80 percent of
gdp. We argue that if the countries from these two groups join the
European Monetary Union, they will be adversely affected by the in-
creasing European debt and will have to participate in resolving the
debt issue as donor countries, which might increase their sovereign
debt to unsustainable levels. On the other hand, the eu ece coun-
tries that use local currencies such as Latvia, Hungary, and Romania
have already beneﬁted from the newly formed European Mecha-
nisms for Financial Stability and a counter argument can be made
that they could beneﬁt even further by becoming members of the
European Monetary Union.
Table 4 shows high volatility in Irish growth from positive 10 per-
cent in 1999 down to negative 8 percent in 2009. Greece has experi-
enced relatively stable positive growth prior to the 2008 ﬁnancial cri-
sis, and has not shown signs of recovery afterwards, but rather has
hovered in the negative growth region, which could continue to fur-
ther depress the Greek economy. While European countries in gen-
eral experienced negative gdp growth after 2008, Germany, France,
Belgium, Portugal, and Italy show faster growth recovery and have
already moved towards positive growth in 2010 compared to Greece,
Ireland, and Spain, which still show negative growth in 2010.
In light of the current challenges faced by the Eurozone network
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of ﬁnancial institutions, in December 2011, the European Central
Bank has committed to provide C1 trillion of funds for the European
banks for up to three years in an attempt to stem the effects of the
most recent ﬁnancial crisis. This injection of liquidity intends to give
the European governments three years to make necessary ﬁscal ad-
justments, and only time could tell whether this added liquidity into
the European banking system will end the European sovereign debt
crisis. However, for a longer-term solution to this crisis, the liquid-
ity infusion needs to be in the form of recapitalization of the strug-
gling banks instead of getting into the vicious cycle of increasing the
sovereign debt of the faltering economies.
The above mentioned difﬁculties that currently plague the eu
are becoming more relevant as additional countries are consider-
ing or will be required to adopt the euro. We discuss these questions
based on regression analyses of economic indicators on one hand
and sovereign debt as percentage of gdp on the other for the eu ece
members and eu candidate countries compared to the Eurozone and
w et e s tt h ef o l l o w i n g4h y p o t h e s i s .
hypothesis testing
h1 Market capitalization of exchange-listed companies leads to in-
crease in government debt.
h2 Electricity use leads to increased government debt.
h3 Exports lead to increase in government debt.
h4 Unemployment leads to increase in government debt.
Data, Models, and Methodology
data
This section describes the data and outlines the methodology used in
the selection of the macroeconomic indicators. In this study we use
the World Bank Development Indicator (wdi) database, containing
approximately one thousand macroeconomic indicators reported an-
nually from 1960s until present for approximately 200 countries. In
addition, since the government debt data was incomplete in the wdi
database, we use the International Monetary Fund Fiscal Affairs De-
partment Public Debt Database containing annual public debt data
for approximately 180 countries since 1960s until present. The deﬁ-
nitions of the data below are taken from the wdi database indicator
description.
Sovereign Debt. Central government debt, total (% of gdp), is the en-
tire stock of direct government ﬁxed-term contractual obligations to
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others outstanding on a particular date. It includes domestic and for-
eign liabilities such as currency and money deposits, securities other
than shares, and loans. It is the gross amount of government liabil-
ities reduced by the amount of equity and ﬁnancial derivatives held
by the government.
Inﬂation. Measured by the consumer price index, inﬂation reﬂects
the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer
of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be ﬁxed or
changed at speciﬁed intervals, such as yearly.
Unemployment. Refers to the share of the labor force (% of total la-
bor force) that is without work but available for and seeking employ-
ment.
Imports. Refers to a total of imports of goods and services (% of gdp).
Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and
other market services received from the rest of the world.
Exports . Represents the value of all goods and other market ser-
vices provided to the rest of the world (% of gdp). Exports include the
value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties,
license fees, and other services, such as communication, construc-
tion, ﬁnancial, information, business, personal, and government ser-
vices. Exports exclude compensation of employees and investment
income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.
Market Capitalization. Represents total market capitalization (share
price times the number of shares outstanding) of listed companies
(% of gdp). Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorpo-
rated companies listed on the country’s stock exchanges at the end
of the year. Listed companies do not include investment companies,
mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles. The sample
is restricted to the period for which annual data are available: from
1961 to 2010 (50 observations for country). The above time series
data are collected and retrieved from the World Growth Indicator
database published by the World Bank.
Gross Domestic Product (gdp) Per Capita Growth. Annual percent-
age growth rate of gdp per capita based on constant local currency.
gdp per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear popu-
lation. gdp at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by
all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
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Foreign Direct Investments represent net inﬂows of investment to ac-
quire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting
stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of
the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earn-
ings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the
balance of payments. This series shows net inﬂows (new investment
inﬂows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign
investors, and is divided by gdp.
Research and Development. Expenditures for research and develop-
ment are current and capital expenditures (both public and private)
on creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge,
including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use
of knowledge for new applications. r&d covers basic research, ap-
plied research, and experimental development. Research and devel-
opment is expressed as percentage of gdp.
Electric Power Consumption. Expressed as kWh per capita, it mea-
sures the production of power plants and combined heat and power
plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and
own use by heat and power plants.
CO2
Emissions. Expressed as metric tons per capita, carbon dioxide emis-
sions are those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the
manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced dur-
ing consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas ﬂaring.
Energy Use (kg of oil equivalent per capita). Refers to the use of pri-
mary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is
equal to indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, mi-
nus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in in-
ternational transport.
Education. School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) or gross enrolment
ratio in tertiary education (isced 5 and 6), regardless of age, ex-
pressed as a percentage of the total population of the ﬁve-year age
group following secondary school (isced is International Standard
Classiﬁcation of Education. Level 5 is ﬁrst stage of tertiary educa-
tion and level 6 is second stage of tertiary education including active
research involvement).
Women Representation in National Parliaments. Indicates the per-
centage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held
by women.
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models and methodology
In this study we examine fourteen macroeconomic indicators de-
scribed in the previous section to determine which factors might be
most importantly related to increase in government debt, which was
the main culprit for the precipitous ﬁnancial crisis in the Eurozone.
We divide the countries in three analytical groups, Eurozone, eu ece
members that use local currencies, and eu candidate countries. We
obtain the regressors for different groups by starting with the origi-
nal fourteen macroeconomic indicators and by using a stepwise re-
gression approach with backward elimination of variables until we
reach the optimal model with fewer independent variables to avoid
over-ﬁtting. We ﬁrst check for variable signiﬁcance and methodi-
cally exclude the non-signiﬁcant variables to continue the model se-
lection process with only effective variables. We eliminate variables
with large aic values and test whether after variable elimination the
model has improved (lower) aic value. aic is the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion test that measures relative goodness of ﬁt of a sta-
tistical model. The lower the aic, the better the goodness of model
ﬁt. We test for multicollinearity by checking vif (Variance Inﬂation
Factor) values for each variable and we exclude the variables with
vif>10. As a rule of thumb, vif larger than 10 signiﬁes existence
of muilticollinearity. We then perform the t-test for individual coef-
ﬁcient signiﬁcance and the F-test for joint coefﬁcient signiﬁcance.
We analyze the anova table to compare the quality of the original
and the resulting simpliﬁed model and accept the simpliﬁed model
if there is insufﬁcient evidence to reject it. Lastly, we plot the resid-
uals to check the ﬁtting and to ensure no serial correlation exists in
the residuals.
Using the above methodology, we develop the following models for
the three different groups that we study:
Group 1 includes seventeen Eurozone countries of the European
Union: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Spain.
The model for Group 1:
sd=α+β1·Inf +β2·Cap+β3·Unemp+β4·Elc.( 1 )
Group 2 includes seven Eastern European countries of the European
Union that still use their respective local currencies: Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.
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The model for Group 2:
sd=α+β1·Exp+β2·fdi+β3·Unemp+β4·wip (2)
Group 3 includes six European Union candidate countries: Croatia,
Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey.
The model for Group 3:
sd=α+β1·Exp+β2·Cap+β3·Elc+β4·CO2.( 3 )
Where, sd – Sovereign Debt as percentage of gdp, α –i n t e r c e p t ,
β(1,n) – regressors’ coefﬁcients, Inf – inﬂation, Cap – market capital-
ization of exchange-listed companies, Unemp – unemployment, Elc –
electricity consumption, Exp – exports, fdi – Foreign Direct Invest-
ments, wip – women representation in National Parliaments, CO2 –
Carbon Dioxide emissions.
regression analysis and hypothesis testing results
In table 5 we report the coefﬁcients of the regressors in the models,
the t-statistics for the coefﬁcients, standard errors, and the p-values
for the three different groups of countries. The regression models
have Sovereign debt as percentage of gdp as a regressand and a set
of macroeconomic indicators as regressors obtained as explained in
the Models and Methodology section.
In testing hypothesis 1, which states that market capitalization of
exchange-listed companies leads to government debt, table 5 shows
that market capitalization has a negative direct effect on the increase
of government debt and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level
for the Eurozone and the eu candidate countries.
In testing hypothesis 2, which states that increased use of electric-
ity leads to government debt, table 5 shows that use of electricity has
negative relation with increase of government debt and is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level for the Eurozone and at 0.001 level
for the eu candidate countries.
In testing hypothesis 3, which states that higher exports lead to
government debt, table 5 shows that exports are positively related
to government debt and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level
for eu ece countries that still use their local currencies and is also
positively related to government debt for the eu candidate countries
with statistical signiﬁcance of 0.05.
In testing hypothesis 4, which states that unemployment leads to
government debt, table 5 shows that unemployment has positive di-
rect effect on an increase of government debt and is statistically sig-
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table 5 Sovereign debt as percentage of gross domestic product
Item Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Intercept –0.02811 0.002018 –0.05455
t-value (–0.480) (0.028) (–0.744)
Std. Error 0.05861 0.073129 0.07335
p-value 0.6321 0.978056 0.461491
Inﬂation –0.30205***
t-value (–4.486)
Std. Error 0.06733
p-value 1.36e−5
Market cap –0.26449*** –0.37375***
t-value (–4.358) (–4.207)
Std. Error 0.06069 0.08884
p-value 2.31e−5 0.000129
Unemployment 0.27323*** 0.309432***
t-value (4.025) (3.906)
Std. Error 0.06788 0.079218
p-value 8.69e−5 0.000198
Electricity use –0.15221* –0.41441***
t-value (–2.45) (–4.14)
Std. Error 0.06213 0.10009
p-value 0.0153 0.000159***
Exports 0.327971*** 0.19505*
t-value (3.94) (2.253)
Std. Error 0.083251 0.08657
p-value 0.000177 0.029401
Continued on the next page
niﬁcant at the 0.001 level for the Eurozone and for the eu ece coun-
tries that still use their local currencies.
Discussion and Policy Implications
Previous studies show that it is questionable whether it is better to
encourage economic convergence given the possibility of future eco-
nomic shocks, and the relatively high probability of being swept by
the crisis contagion phenomenon as experienced in some past in-
stances if the economies are highly correlated. Examples of recent
crises contagions include Western Europe during 1992–1993, Latin
America in 1982, 1994–1995, and 1998–1999, East Asia in 1997–1998,
and the Russian default crisis of 1998 (Frankel 2004). With high mu-
tual economic convergence, even if the eu candidate countries or
the eu ece countries that still use their local currencies can escape
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table 5 Continued from the previous page
Item Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
fdi –0.466379***
t-value (–5.908)
Std. Error 0.078944
p-value 8.6e−8
Women in Parliament 0.175091*
t-value (2.070)
Std. Error 0.0846
p-value 0.041797
CO2 emissions –0.24089**
t–value (–2.697)
Std. Error 0.0893
p-value 0.009939
N 169 82 47
Multiple R2 0.344 0.545 0.6689
Adjusted R20.328 0.521 0.6381
F21.62 23.33 21.72
rse 0.7599 0.6661 0.5243
notes Group 1 includes seventeen Eurozone countries of the European Union: Aus-
tria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Spain. Group
2 includes seven Eastern European countries of the European Union that still use
their respective local currencies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, and Romania. Group 3 includes six European Union candidate coun-
tries: Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. Signiﬁcance:
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05).
the direct impact of e.g. the European sovereign debt crisis, they
will most likely be affected indirectly. For example, while the Eu-
ropean Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (the Troika) currently support Greece, a new
Greek government may reject the bailout agreement and the Troika
may withdraw the support. If Greece exits the Eurozone, as hypoth-
esized by Citigroup and Morgan Stanley’s economic teams (Elliott
2012), among others, this will adversely affect not only Europe, but
also the United States and China. Europe may enter severe reces-
sion, the us may be pushed into a milder recession, and the growth
of China will slow down signiﬁcantly.
To that effect, it is important that besides the Treaty of Rome of
1957, The Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and the Stability and Growth
Pact of 1997, which deﬁne the criteria for a country to become a
member of the eu and emu, a well-deﬁned process should be in
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place for situations when a country ought to exit the Eurozone. An-
other missing part of these treaties is the fact that even though Eu-
ropean countries have to move in the right direction to meet re-
quired economic criteria while they are in the process of negotiation
to enter the emu, once they become part of the Eurozone, their ﬁscal
discipline tends to disappear. Under these circumstances, the emu
and the euro may encounter more and larger crisis in the future, so
a question remains whether the eu ece and eu candidate countries
should advocate for use of their local currency.
Some Eurozone countries, once part of the emu, considerably in-
creased their borrowing to unsustainable national government debt
to gdp ratios. The Greek and the Irish debt crisis were merely a
wake-up call for the eu as these economies are relatively small, with
gdpso fC215 billion and C156 billion respectively, and combined,
smaller than the gdp of Pennsylvania. The bigger problems are lur-
ing from debt issues of much larger economies such as Italy and
Spain. Italy has close to C2 trillion debt outstanding, of which, 50
percent is ﬁnanced externally. Spain has over C700 billion of pub-
lic debt outstanding combined with its dire unemployment rate of 22
percent (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Loius 2011).
The European integration is intended to stabilize the use and allo-
cation of resources, to make the job market more efﬁcient, to stream-
line investment opportunities, and to pool the opportunities and
risks of the common marketplace. Financial integration allows in-
vestors to improve their capital allocation decisions and beneﬁt from
improved liquidity and efﬁcient asset allocation. While the prices of
tradable goods are usually determined by international competition,
it is more difﬁcult to achieve price convergence for non-tradable
goods that are only traded and consumed in one country’s local econ-
omy. This can cause big price differentials in different economies
and contribute to devaluation of domestic currencies, distortion of
prices, or reduced competition during the country’s transformation
process. Even though price arbitrage can accelerate the price con-
vergence, in an environment where there are obstacles, such as re-
strictions on movement of labor, high transportation costs that re-
strict tradability, regulations, or quotas, price differentials can last
for prolonged periods of time (Zdarek 2008). These considerations
are especially important when analyzing the timing and beneﬁts or
difﬁculties of euro adoption for the eu ece countries that use local
currencies and eu candidate countries.
Previous studies show that openness and increased trade among
countries is one of the main attributes of economic convergence (Fa-
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tas 1997; Clark and van Wincoop 2001; Calderon, Chong, and Stein
2007). In the case of eu ece countries, Fidrmuc and Iikka (2004),
using data through 2001, reports that correlations for Poland and
Hungary with the German economy have increased throughout the
1990s. Darvas and Szapary (2008b) have reported that the Slovenian
economy exhibits high degree of synchronization with the economy
of the European Monetary Union (emu), while examples of countries
with lower historical correlations with the emu economy include the
Baltic countries, and the Czech and Slovak Republics.
It is arguable that sometimes countries should join the emu even
if they have not reached the desired economic convergence. By join-
ing the emu, the country will naturally increase the trade with the
other members, and will reach economic convergence, which means
not only convergence in business cycles, but also narrowing the gaps
in productivity, real income, and other macroeconomic indicators
(Frankel 2004). This is only desirable if countries that have not satis-
ﬁed the economic criteria for eu accession are steering the required
macroeconomic indicators in the right direction. Otherwise, not hav-
ing satisﬁed the economic requirements for eu accession and having
wrong directional movement of the same, signalizes no economic,
monetary or ﬁscal discipline and could later create a potential prob-
lem for the Eurozone like in the case of Greece (Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Loius 2011).
Conclusion: To Adopt Or Not to Adopt the Euro,
That Is the Question Now
In this paper we analyzed three groups of countries (1) the seven-
teen Eurozone countries that have adopted the euro, (2) the seven
eu ece member countries that still use their local currencies, and
(3) the eu candidate countries. We studied temporal dynamics of se-
lected macroeconomic indicators such as central government debt,
inﬂation, market capitalization of exchange-listed companies, and
gdp per capita growth for selected eu ece members and eu candi-
date countries to understand signiﬁcant changes that occurred be-
tween 1999, at the beginning of the euro era, up to 2011.
We investigated the relationships between a group of macroeco-
nomic indicators on one hand and sovereign debt as percentage of
gdp on the other, for the three groups of countries that we study.
By analyzing the regression results we studied potential beneﬁts or
difﬁculties stemming from adopting the euro for the eu ece coun-
tries and eu candidates. We conclude that even though the European
Monetary Union is strategically, politically and economically impor-
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tant, and its enlargement is well intended, the most recent European
sovereign debt crisis has created additional challenges that need to
be taken in consideration by the eu ece member countries and eu
candidate countries when considering the replacement of their lo-
cal currencies with the euro. Improving the economic stability of
the European Union may be achieved more rapidly if no new mem-
bers are added to the European Monetary Union for the time being.
We believe that it could be advantageous for both, the eu ece coun-
tries still using their local currencies and the eu candidate countries
to consider delaying the replacement of their local currencies with
the euro. To defer adopting the euro may be mutually beneﬁcial for
all, the Eurozone, the eu ece and eu Candidate countries. Once the
sovereign debt crisis is subdued, the adoption of the common cur-
rency may be reconsidered based on the economic parameters and
framework at the future time.
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